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In May 2002, a landslide on the south bank of the Blackwater River damaged the Missouri Route K bridge that crosses it. A flood on 
the river triggered the landslide. Based on the field investigation and stability back-analysis, it appeared that the landslide actually 
consisted of two separate slides – a shallow slide triggered by rapid drawdown of the river and a deep slide triggered by artesian water 
pressures in a subsurface gravel layer. A rock berm that was keyed into the gravel was constructed to stabilize the slope. The rock toe 
berm was designed to resist both the shallow and deep slide by providing weight to the slope to prevent a rapid drawdown failure and 





The Missouri Route K bridge over the Blackwater River is a 
five-span steel girder structure near the town of Blackwater, 
Missouri (see Fig. 1). The bridge was built in the late 1960’s 
and the bridge piers are founded on H-piles driven to bedrock 
or footings on bedrock. Figure 2 presents a design cross-
section of the bridge. 
 
In May 2002 during a flood event on the Blackwater River, a 
landslide occurred on the south riverbank. The landslide 
caused bridge Pier 4 to move approximately 12 to 15 inches 
horizontally toward the river and 1 to 1.5 inches vertically 
upward. The pier movement caused the bridge girders to drop 
off the rocker bearings. The damage caused by the slide 
resulted in the Missouri Department of Transportation 
(MoDOT) closing the bridge to vehicular traffic.  
 
This paper describes the landslide event; summarizes the 
landslide investigation and back-analysis; presents the various 
stabilization options that were considered; details the selected 




LANDSLIDE EVENT AND INVESTIGATION 
 
In late May 2002, local residents of Blackwater and the 
surrounding area noticed a sag in the Route K bridge deck and 
railing. The residents alerted MoDOT. On May 29, 2002, 
MoDOT emergency personnel observed that the rockers 
supporting the main span girders had “rolled over” at all the 
bearings at Pier 4 of the bridge (see Fig. 3). MoDOT personnel 
suspected that a landslide had occurred and closed the bridge 
to vehicular traffic. MoDOT retained URS Corporation to 
investigate the landslide and recommend stabilization options. 
Fig. 1. Site Vicinity Map. 
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Field Reconnaissance 
 
After the floodwaters receded, a site survey indicated that Pier 
4 moved about 12 to 15 inches laterally toward the river and 
about 1 to 1.5 inches vertically upward. No other piers showed 
movement. 
 
On June 7, 2002, we observed a number of scarps striking 
roughly parallel to the river extending from the riverbank to 
approximately 10 feet north of Pier 3, as shown in Figs. 4 and 
5. Lateral movements at the scarps were about 1 to 2 inches 
and some showed vertical displacement of up to 12 inches. By 
July 1, 2002 many of the scarps were more visible as a result 
of dry weather. We observed another major scarp (originally 
obscured by vegetation) that was located approximately 40 
feet north of Pier 3 and extended approximately 300 ft to the 
west to a concrete boat ramp (see Fig. 5). The scarp appeared 
to be pre-existing and showed lateral and vertical 




In June 2002, MoDOT drilled two borings through the slide 
mass and into bedrock. The boring locations are shown in Fig. 
5. In one boring, MoDOT installed an open standpipe 
piezometer sealed into a gravel layer overlying bedrock. In the 
other boring, MoDOT installed an inclinometer socketed into 
bedrock. MoDOT personnel observed water flowing freely to 
the tops of the instrument casings (located 2 to 3 ft above 
existing grade). 
 
In early July 2002, URS drilled four borings at the site as 
shown in Fig. 5. URS installed inclinometers (socketed into 
bedrock) in two borings to evaluate the extent of the existing 
slide and monitor slope movements during stabilization work 
at the bridge. URS also installed vibrating wire piezometers at 
three locations. One piezometer was installed to monitor 
groundwater conditions in the gravel layer overlying bedrock, 
and another was installed to monitor the surficial clayey and 
silty soils. URS installed the third piezometer in a 30-ft long 
steel casing that was lowered from the top of the bridge into 
the river to monitor river levels. One end of the casing was 
laid on the south riverbank while the other end extends about 
25 feet into the river. All recent (2002) borings were drilled 
using rotary wash techniques. Samples were obtained using a 
split spoon sampler in accordance with the standard 
penetration test (SPT; ASTM D-1586) or a 3-inch O.D. thin-
walled Shelby tube (ASTM D-1587). 
 
In addition to the recent (2002) borings, borings logs from the 
original bridge borings drilled in 1963 were available. Twelve 
borings were drilled in 1963 – two borings at each bent. These 





Southwest of the river, the site consists of generally level 
ground at approximately El. 600. Approximately 75 to 100 
feet southwest of the river, the grade begins to drop toward the 
river. The riverbank slope varies considerably upstream and 
downstream from the bridge, but it was about 2.5H:1V near 
the centerline of the bridge. 
 
Bridge piers are numbered sequentially from 1 to 6, as 
indicated in Fig. 2. At the time of URS’ field reconnaissance, 
Piers 4 and 5 were located within the river. A concrete boat 
ramp is located about 300 ft upstream of the bridge centerline 
and a 30- to 40-ft wide riprap berm that extends into the river 
is located about 30 ft downstream from the bridge centerline. 
 
 
Fig. 2. General Elevation of Missouri Route K Bridge over Blackwater River (Elevations in feet, NVGD). Fig. 2. General Elevation of Missouri Route K Bridge over Blackwater River (Elevations in feet, NVGD). 
Fig. 3. Damage to Rockers at Pier 4. 
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Subsurface Conditions 
Four primary subsurface strata are present at the site: (1) 
interbedded silts and clays; (2) high plasticity clay; (3) gravel 
and sand; and (4) limestone bedrock. Figure 6 presents the 
subsurface profile and Fig. 7 summarizes the index and 
engineering properties of the materials. 
 
Interbedded Silts and Clays.  Near surface soils consisted of an 
interbedded alluvial deposit of low plasticity silty clay and 
clayey silt with layers of high plasticity clay and sand to 
approximately El. 565. Water contents ranged from 22 to 
50%, averaging about 33%. SPT blowcounts ranged from 3 to 
10, averaging about 5. The undrained shear strength (su) 
determined from two unconfined compression (UC) and four 
unconsolidated-undrained (UU) triaxial tests ranged from 460 
to 1400 psf, averaging about 900 psf. Drained peak friction 
angles (f') ranged from 27 to 33°. 
 
High Plasticity Clay.  All recent (2002) borings encountered a 
2 to 4-ft thick layer of high plasticity clay underlying the clay 
and silt layer. Water contents, liquid limits, and plasticity 
Fig. 4. Northern Portion of "Shallow" Landslide. 
Fig. 6. Subsurface Profile. 
Fig. 5. 2002 Boring Location Plan and Site Observations. 
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indices in this layer ranged from 26 to 57% (3 tests), 65 to 89 
(2 tests), and 41 to 64 (2 tests). Measured drained fully-
softened friction angle (f¢fs) ranged from 17 to 22°, while 
published correlations for f¢ fs ranged from 14 to 18°. 
 
Gravel and Sand.  Underlying the clayey soils, all recent 
borings encountered a 10-ft thick layer of gravel and sand. 
Original bridge borings show that this layer pinches out south 
of Pier 6. Generally, this layer is loose to medium dense with 
SPT blowcounts ranging from 6 to 13. Grain size analyses 
conducted on two split spoon samples indicated average D50, 
D10, Cc (coefficient of curvature), and Cu (coefficient of 
uniformity) values of approximately 10 mm, 3.5 mm, 1.3, and 
4.0, respectively. Additionally, the possible presence of 
cobbles in this layer was inferred from the original bridge 
boring logs, drilling characteristics, and the one high SPT 
blowcount value (N = 47). 
 
Limestone.  Bedrock consists of the Burlington Limestone 
Formation. Limestone cores indicated that the depth of 
weathering is thin (typically less than 2 to 5 ft thick) and the 
unweathered limestone is of good quality, with RQD values 
ranging from 72 to 100%. Limestone outcrops near the bridge 
were heavily jointed, with both open vertical joints and open, 
closely spaced horizontal bedding joints.  
 
Groundwater.  Although initial observations indicated an 
artesian head in the gravel layer (i.e., observed from water 
flowing from instrument casings), piezometer readings 
indicated that the artesian pressure had dissipated by early July 
2002. Groundwater levels in the slope stabilized at El. 587 to 
590 and the river level receded to El. 580. The river level 





We conducted a back-analysis of the slope failure to estimate 
the groundwater conditions required to trigger failure. This 
section describes the key observations, discusses our 
assumptions and back-analysis of the slope failure, and 





On approximately May 20, 2002, a large storm triggered 
flooding on the Blackwater River. Flooding typically occurs 
every spring on the river. The Lamine and Missouri Rivers 
(which are downstream of the Blackwater) were near normal 
river stages at the time of the flood. The precise high water 
elevation on the Blackwater during the flood is not known, but 
watermarks visible in photographs of the bridge suggest a high 
water elevation of at least El. 612.5 to 615. 
 
On May 29, 2002, MoDOT conducted an emergency bridge 
inspection. The floodwaters were at approximately El. 599. 
MoDOT observed damage at Pier 4 and closed the bridge. 
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Fig. 7. Index and Engineering Properties of Subsurface Materials. 
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Divers probed the riverbed and found that the riverbed soils 
were relatively stiff and intact and no scour had occurred.  
 
While installing instrumentation in the slide mass in early June 
2002, MoDOT personnel observed water flowing freely to the 
tops of the instrument casings (located 2 to 3 ft above existing 
grade). Inclinometer measurements in the slide mass indicated 
two zones of soil movement near Pier 4 – from approximately 
0 to 8 ft below grade (within the clay and silt layer) and 24 to 
28 ft below grade (within the high plasticity clay layer). By 
June 25, the slope movement essentially had stopped. By July 
1, inclinometer measurements indicated that essentially no 
movements were occurring and that water levels had stabilized 
at El. 587 to 590 in the slope and at El. 580 in the river. 
 
 
Assumptions for Back-Analysis 
 
Based on the field investigation, we anticipated that two 
separate slides occurred at the site – a “shallow” and a “deep” 
slide. The shallow slide likely was triggered by rapid 
drawdown of the river, i.e., high water pressure in the silt and 
clay attempting to exit the slope with no equalizing water 
pressure from the river against the slope. This slide 
presumably occurred after the deep slide as the Blackwater 
River receded. This type of slide occurs regularly along the 
Blackwater and evidence of rapid drawdown slides is visible 
at numerous locations upstream and downstream of the bridge.  
 
We suspected that artesian water pressures in the gravel layer 
triggered the deep slide. Based on observations of limestone 
outcrops along the northern bank, it seems likely that the 
gravel layer is hydraulically connected to the river via jointing 
in the limestone bedrock (and possibly local scour of the 
riverbed). While the floodwaters started to recede, we believe 
sufficient artesian head was present in the gravel layer to 
cause a quick condition below the streambed. This caused the 
clayey streambed soils (and toe of the slope) to fracture and 
“blowout.” When the toe of the slope was lost, a slide 
occurred within the high plasticity clay near the interface with 
the gravel layer or along the upper surface of the gravel and 
sand layer. These circumstances are rather unique because 
similar failures did not occur during major floods in 1993 and 
1995. In this case, we presume that the floodwaters receded 
more quickly than the artesian pressure dissipated due to the 
relatively low levels of the Lamine and Missouri Rivers. 
 
Initial stability back-analyses appeared to substantiate the 
potential failure mechanisms and separate slides described 
above. However, a number of assumptions were required to 
conduct the back-analysis. Our assumptions are shown below. 
Table 1 provides the input soil parameters used for the various 
materials. 
 
· The upper clay and silt layer was undrained during the deep 
failure and was assigned undrained strength parameters. 
During the shallow, rapid drawdown failure, the clay and 
silt were partially drained. We assigned this layer a bi-linear 
envelope proposed by the Corps’ of Engineers (1970) for 
rapid drawdown analysis. We used this simplified strength 
envelope because insufficient test data were available to 
define more detailed failure criteria such as those proposed 
by Lowe and Karafiath (1960) or Duncan et al. (1990). 
· At least the lower portion of the high plasticity clay was 
drained during all cases due to its proximity to the gravel 
layer. For modeling purposes, we assigned the entire layer 
its drained shear strength and assumed that it was 
hydraulically connected to the artesian water pressures. 
· The gravel layer was modeled as a limit boundary to allow a 
composite/block slip surface through the high plasticity 
clay, the weakest layer. 
· Due to modeling limitations of the computer software, we 
iteratively determined the extent of quick conditions in the 
gravel for various artesian pressures for the deep slide. 
Where the gravel layer was quick, we assumed that this 
would cause an uplift failure, i.e., “blowout,” of the clayey 
soils above the gravel. We assumed that the boundary of this 
uplifted block (along the fracture) would temporarily have 
zero shear strength. For modeling purposes, we assigned 
zero shear strength to the entire uplifted zone. However, we 
restricted the deep failure surfaces to those that passed 
through the high plasticity clay such that unrealistic surfaces 
that passed through the middle of the uplifted block (with 





The results of the back-analyses are presented below. In 
addition, we evaluated the current stability of the shallow and 
Unit
Weight c f' c f' c f' c f'
Soil Layer (pcf) Drainage (psf) (
o) Drainage (psf) (
o) Drainage (psf) (
o) Drainage (psf) (
o)
Silt and Clay 115 Partial Undrained 300b 16b Undrained 300b 16b Undrained 300b 16b
"Quick" Silt and Clayc 115 -- -- -- Undrained 0 0 -- -- -- -- -- --
High Plasticity Clay 115 Drained 0 17 Drained 0 17 Drained 0 17 Drained 0 17
Gravel and Sand 115 Drained 0 35 Drained 0 35 Drained 0 35 Drained 0 35
Rock Blanket Fill 120 -- -- -- -- -- -- Drained 0 34 Drained 0 34
 aBilinear envelope recommended by Corps' of Engineers (1970): f' = 28o, c' = 0 to s'n = 1250 psf; then f = 16
o, c = 300 psf.
 bCombination of c and f used to model slightly overconsolidated soil with su = 300 psf at ground surface and su/s'v = 0.29 (silt and clay primarily in triaxial compression).
 cSoil located in streambed at toe of slope.
bilinear envelopea
Rock Toe Berm






Table 1. Soil Properties used for Slope Stability Analyses. 
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deep slide to provide an additional check on the input soil 
strength parameters. We conducted the slope stability analyses 
using Spencer’s (1967) method as coded in the software 
program SLOPE/W (Geo-Slope 2002). 
 
Shallow Slide.  Figure 8 presents the back-analysis results for 
the shallow, rapid drawdown failure. As indicated in the 
figure, the head of the critical slip surface corresponds to the 
large scarp at the edge of the bank. Furthermore, the depth of 
the critical slip surface corresponds to the upper zone of 
movement measured in MoDOT I-1. We believe that this slide 
occurred after the deep failure as the floodwaters had receded, 
and that this slide did not influence the movement of Pier 4. 
 
Deep Slide.  Figure 9 presents the back-analysis results for the 
deep failure related to artesian pressures. As indicated in the 
figure, an artesian water level in the gravel layer of El. 620 is 
required to yield a factor of safety of about unity. This implies 
that the flood levels were higher than El. 612.5 and/or joints in 
the limestone charged the artesian pressures. This artesian 
head triggered quick conditions over a wide zone in the gravel 
layer. The soil labeled “quick” clay and silt indicates the 
extent of quick conditions in the gravel layer. In addition, a 
tension crack to the depth of the more permanent watertable 
(about El. 590) was added to reduce tensile forces in the slices. 
Figure 9 indicates that the head of the critical slip surface falls 
between the cracks observed just north of Pier 3 and the 
bottom of the critical slip surface corresponds to the lower 
zone of movement measured in the inclinometer. 
 
Because the stability analyses provided factors of safety close 
to unity, these conditions (i.e., an approximate head difference 
of about 20 feet between the river and gravel layer) were 
judged to reasonably approximate the critical conditions that 
triggered failure. Therefore, we used these conditions to 





For evaluating the post-failure stability of the slope, we 
assumed that water levels in the slope and the river were 
consistent with porewater pressures measured in early July 
2002 and no artesian pressures were present in the gravel 
layer.  
 
The analyses indicated that the shallow slide was marginally 
stable, with a factor of safety (FS) of about 1.1. This FS is 
consistent with the minor creep movements observed in 
MoDOT I-1. As such, the drained friction angle of 28° 
assumed for the clay and silt layer appeared reasonable.  
 
The analyses also indicated that the deep slide had stabilized, 
with a FS of about 1.3. This FS was consistent with the 
inclinometer data in MoDOT I-1 and survey measurements of 
Pier 4 that indicated essentially no continuing movement of 
the deep slide or Pier 4. 
 
 
LANDSLIDE STABILIZATION DESIGN 
 
We developed a number of design options to stabilize the 
slope failure. These options included: 
 
· A rock toe berm; 
Fig. 8. Back-analysis of "Shallow" Slide. 
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· drainage of the gravel layer via pressure relief wells; 
· a rock shear key; and 
· a “do nothing” approach for slide stabilization while 
designing a replacement bridge pier to accommodate the 
lateral soil load due to slope failure.  
 
MoDOT selected the rock toe berm option on the basis of cost 
and its ability to prevent both the deep and shallow slides. 
Furthermore, we considered it unlikely that the relief well 




Rock Toe Berm Design 
 
Figure 10 shows the design configuration of the rock toe berm. 
The only restriction for the toe berm was that the final berm 
configuration was limited to the geometric limits of the 
riverbank at the time of bridge construction in 1963. The final 
slope of the toe berm is 1.5H:1V and the top of the berm is at 
El. 590. This configuration was developed to provide a factor 
of safety against slope failure of at least 1.3 throughout 
construction and during a repeat of the water conditions that 
caused the failure in Spring 2002 (i.e., river level at El. 599, 
artesian head at El. 620). To prevent scour and erosion of the 
toe berm material, it was decided to utilize MoDOT Type 2 
Rock Blanket material (about 3-ft diameter rock). 
 
The rock toe trench provides a drainage path for artesian 
pressures during flood events. This element of the repair will 
prevent a quick condition from developing in the gravel layer 
and prevent a “blowout” near the berm toe. Furthermore, the 
toe trench protects the berm from being undercut by local 
erosion or scour of streambed soils at the toe of the berm. 
Lastly, the weight of the berm prevents a shallow rapid 
drawdown failure of the riverbank clays and silts. 
 
 
Replacement Pier Design 
 
As a result of the landslide-induced damage to Pier 4, it was 
necessary to replace the existing pier. To achieve a redundant 
design, MoDOT decided to design the foundation for the 
replacement pier to withstand the lateral soil pressures 
resulting from the landslide assuming that no slide 
stabilization was constructed. We estimated that the lateral soil 
load on the shafts would be uniformly distributed with a 
magnitude of 10.8 ksf. This value corresponds to 12su, where 
the design undrained shear strength, su, was taken as 900 psf. 
 
To withstand these lateral pressures, two 9-ft diameter drilled 
shafts were required for the Pier 4 replacement foundation. 
The shafts required 8.5-ft diameter sockets drilled 17 ft into 
limestone bedrock. Because of an accelerated construction 
schedule, construction of the shafts was to be done 
concurrently with slide stabilization work. 
 
 
SLOPE STABILIZATION AND PIER REPLACEMENT 
 
Stabilization and pier replacement work for the bridge started 
in October 2002. During excavation of the bank to a slope of 
3H:1V, a crack opened approximately 6 ft upstation of Pier 3. 
The crack had a maximum horizontal displacement of 4 to 5 
Fig. 9. Back-analysis of "Deep" Slide. Note that Pile Cap 4 was Moved 12 to 15 inches Laterally and 1 to 1.5 inches Vertically. 
1 to 1.5” 
12 to 15” 
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inches and zero vertical displacement; however, ground 
surface measurements at Pier 3 indicated that the ground had 
subsided about 1 inch. We anticipate that slope movement 
occurred because the contractor began excavating the 
riverbank slope from the “bottom up” (rather than “top 
down”), thereby removing confining pressure at the toe before 
removing driving stress at the top of the slope. To prevent 
further movement, rock was dumped along the lower portion 
of the slope. Following rock placement, no additional 
movements were measured at Piers 3 or 4, at the surface 
survey markers, or in the inclinometers near Pier 3.  
 
Prior to excavating the rock toe trench, the drilled shafts were 
excavated and cased using temporary steel casings. A work 
pad consisting of rock fill was placed around the temporary 
casings to about 1-ft above the river level to allow access to 
the toe trench location. The sides of the toe trench remained 
nearly vertical until the gravel layer was encountered. Rock 
fill was immediately dumped into the toe trench excavation. 
We anticipated that the rock fill would become infilled with 
river sediments over time. However, we also expect that any 
infilling will be “blown out” by minor buildups of artesian 
pressure in the gravel, allowing dissipation of artesian 





The remainder of the rock toe berm was constructed without 
incident. The drilled shafts were poured on November 29, 
2002 and December 11, 2002. Demolition of the existing pier 
and construction of the replacement pier started on December 
12, 2002. Following completion of the pier replacement, the 
Route K Bridge over the Blackwater River was re-opened to 
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